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I.   BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND METHODOLOGY 
A.   Background 
1.       Lebanon has one of the highest public debt stocks (relative to GDP) in the world, 
currently at over 185 percent of 2003 GDP. Economic policy continues to be dominated by 
chronic imbalances in government finances which have seen the budget deficit average over 
17 percent of GDP over the past five years.  
2.       For a better appreciation of the current policy issues, the origins and evolution of 
current fiscal problems need to be ascertained: as shown below, fiscal disarray resulting from 
16 years of brutal civil war and delays in implementing post-war fiscal adjustments partly 
explain the current situation. Furthermore, an unstable and corrupt political environment and 
social reluctance to proposed fiscal adjustments, as well as other structural and technical 





3.       The effects of war on public finances can be grouped under four major themes (see 
Table 1 in Appendix): 
•  A general breakdown in government authority, with direct consequences on revenue 
collection. Revenue went from over 15 percent of GDP before 1975 to well below 8 
percent on average for the period 1975-1989. In 1988 for example, revenue reached 
an all-time low of 1.8 percent of GDP. The loss of control over the airports and 
seaports meant lost customs revenue for the government, which was (and still is, 
although at a diminishing rate) the most important tax revenue. 
•  The stagnant and irregular economic activity, as well as a general environment of 
mistrust and social chaos further exacerbated revenue collection. 
•  Periods of high inflation led to an erosion of real revenue. 
•  Government expenditure, as a percentage of GDP, rose to over 20 percent on 
account that the authorities had attempted to maintain a minimum level of social 
and public services through subsidies to basic staples and services, and on account 
of high military expenditures and increased interest payments. 
                                                 
1 Helbling (1999)  
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As a result, the newly formed government at the end of 1990 inherited a sizeable 
amount of budget debt, valued net at around 87 percent of GDP. 
Postwar Stabilization (1991-1992) 
4.       The fiscal situation in 1991 and 1992 improved considerably for several reasons: 
revenue recovered as the government of national unity regained control over revenue sources 
(particularly with respect to customs and non-tax revenues), growth picked up rapidly as a 
result of economic activity normalization, and expenditures declined due to the elimination 
of military expenditures and an institution of a hiring freeze. Finally overall fiscal deficit as a 
percentage of GDP dropped to 13 percent in 1991 and 11 percent in 1992. 
Postwar Reconstruction (1993-2001) 
5.       More generally, the 90’s were characterized with large deviations of the actual budget 
deficits and the actual debt path from targets that had been registered from 1994 onward, 
leading most to believe that more fiscal adjustments were needed. Previous fiscal 
adjustments were mainly underpinned by expenditure restraint and increased revenue 
resulting from economic growth and better tax administration, but were not sufficient.  



















Overall Balance (excluding grants) Primary Balance (excluding grants)
 
 
6.       Reflecting considerable political and macroeconomic uncertainties immediately after 
the war, Lebanon initially had only very limited access to either international capital markets  
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or foreign official financing and had to resort to domestic capital markets to finance its 
budget deficit. Short-term treasury bills denominated in Lebanese pounds with maturities 
from 3 to 12 months were the only available instrument initially, with an average maturity of 
9-10 months. At the end of 1997, about 7 percent of the outstanding treasury bills were held 
by nonresident investors. 
Paris II and Beyond (2002-Present) 
7.       The positive outcome of the Paris II donor conference (November 24, 2002) has 
given Lebanon a “breathing space” in which to address the stock and flow fiscal difficulties 
that are at the heart of the economic vulnerabilities facing the country. Cash commitments 
from the conference amounted to $2.9 billion (approximately 10 percent of total government 
debt back in 2002). Another $1.3 billion was committed for project financing. These long 
term concessionary loans (about 15 years) have a grace period of 5 years and carry an 
average annual interest rates of around 3-6 percent range. 
8.       This presented the government with the opportunity to retire some of the higher yield 
Lebanese pounds T-bills, and also some dollar-denominated Eurobonds as this may reduce 
the market’s probability of a devaluation or even default. 
9.       Owing to a sizeable reduction of interest charges and a projected increase in the 
primary balance, the overall government balance could decline from 14.6 percent of GDP in 
2003 to about 8 percent of GDP in 2004, according to recent IMF trends and projections
2. 
This should in principle bring back the overall debt-to-GDP ratio back to 2002 levels at 178 
percent of GDP. The immediate impacts of Paris II also included a decline in the interest bill 
(by 5.5 percentage points of GDP in 2004) due to refinancing at lower global interest rates. 
B.   Motivation and Methodology 
10.       Recent data suggests that there are tentative signs of a certain reversal in direction of 
the overall debt-to-GDP ratio in Lebanon. The most recent IMF projections
3 notes that lower 
financing costs and higher revenue and spending restraint have improved debt dynamics. 
However, in the absence of additional fiscal adjustment, and in an environment of rising 
interest rates, debt dynamics would again become unstable in the medium-to-long term. 
11.       Progress with many of the fiscal measures the government agreed to undertake in the 
context of Paris II has been poor, partly as a result of political bickering and the easing of the 
immediate pressure on the budget, sapping the reform programme of its urgency. Recent 
political developments ( the de facto sacking of Prime Minister Hariri after a bitter power 
struggle with President Lahoud and the passing of a critical resolution at the UN Security 
                                                 
2 IMF (September 2004) 
3 IMF (August 2004)  
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Council condemning the handling of the issue) only add to the uncertainty that the reform 
train will pick up steam anytime soon
4. 
12.       IMF previous medium-term projections
5 of debt-to-GDP ratios for Lebanon in the 
Article IV context have been systematically over-optimistic and off-target. Projections done 
in 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999, and 2001 projected a conversion point in the debt-to-GDP curve 
within 2 to 3 years of the projection date. None of these conversion points materialized. The 
aim of this paper is to offer an alternative medium-term projection of the debt ratio, 
while trying to refine the judgment on variables and assumptions that enter into the 
projection. More specifically, more emphasis will be given to political and social factors that 
often through Lebanon’s history hindered or dwarfed any reform momentum. Consistent with 
a Debt Sustainability Analysis framework, a set of assumptions on  public debt, primary 
balance, revenue and expenditure structure and trend, gross financing,  and interest rate and 
growth dynamics will be formulated. The analysis will be complemented with a look at a 
reduced set of vulnerability indicators for public sector debt sustainability.
                                                 
4 Economist Intelligence Unit (November 2004) 
5 IMF (May 2002)  
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II.   ANATOMY OF LEBANON’S PUBLIC DEBT 
A.   Description 
13.       Lebanon’s gross debt stands today at close to 35 billion U.S. dollars, or 178 percent 
of preliminary 2004 GDP, according to the latest figures from the IMF Art IV mission (See 
Table 2 in Appendix). It is down from 185 percent of GDP in 2003, although the 2004 
figures are only preliminary. It is 55 percent domestic currency dominated, and is mostly 
short term financed by , first, the non-bank sector (including individuals) at 47 percent share, 
second, by the BdL at 23 percent share, and third, by the commercial banks at 17 percent 
share.  






















   Other debt to nonbank sector
   Debt to public entities
   Debt to commercial banks
   Debt to BdL
 
14.       A closer look at the fiscal environment in Lebanon reveals the following main points 
about the composition of government revenues and expenditures (See Tables 3 and 4): 
•  A growing reliance on direct taxes: the recent successful introduction of a new 
VAT tax on goods has seen a gradual shift towards reliance on direct taxes and less 
reliance on indirect taxes like customs duties, which used to constitute the bulk of 
government receipts in previous years, especially during the war. This in term gives 
the government more fiscal flexibility in terms of direct control over tax receipts, with 
an general increase in tax elasticity. 
•  A momentarily shrinking interest bill: interest payments to GDP has been declining 
since 2003 after the government successfully refinanced with lower rates part of its  
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outstanding Eurobonds through a swap in August 2004 (and also directly related to 
the after-effects of Paris II in 2002). The interest bill fell from 18.2 percent of GDP in 
2003 to a preliminary 12.7 percent of GDP in 2004. This again provides more fiscal 
flexibility for the short term, although it is not clear if this trend will continue in the 
longer term as world rates rise and refinancing occurs at higher costs (see Section III 
for a more detailed analysis of assumptions for a medium-term debt sustainability 
analysis). 
•  A high level of nondiscretionary spending: A principal source of vulnerability is a 
high proportion of nondiscretionary spending to total spending, which limits a 
government’s flexibility to adjust spending levels downward when it is necessary to 
do so. Current primary expenditures stand at 16.8 percent of GDP, or 85 percent of 
primary expenditures, including a sizeable 1.7 percent of GDP in forms of transfers to 
EdL (Electricite du Liban, the state power company) and NSSF (the social security 
fund). 
15.       In terms of trends in fiscal balances, we notice a positive trend movement for the 
primary balance-to-GDP ratio, which stands currently at 4.2 percent of GDP, up from 2.9 
percent of GDP in 2002, and up from -17.2 percent of GDP in 1997. The question remains 
whether the recent primary surplus registered is debt-stabilizing if maintained in the future. 
However, overall debt balance have remained in chronic deficit, albeit in an improving trend 
consistent with the improvement in primary deficit trends (overall debt balance stands at -8.2 
percent of GDP, down from -15.1 percent of GDP in 2002). 
16.       Overall, budgetary performance in 2004 has been much stronger than expected, due 
largely to solid revenue growth. VAT receipts have been particularly buoyant, but revenue 
performance has been strong across the board. Non-interest budgetary expenditure has been 
contained effectively. 
B.   Sources of Fiscal Vulnerability 
17.       Fiscal risk analysis is an attempt to gauge the sensitivity of fiscal outcomes to 
variations in key underlying assumptions and other factors
6. It is also conceivable that a 
situation where government debt may not continue to be promptly or fully serviced, despite 
the Lebanese government’s best intentions (and their unblemished payment record), as the 
result of a form of self-fulfilling expectations. This is related to the “second generation type” 
model of speculative attack, where it is the speculative pressure itself that pushes the 
government to default. The following however is an identification of the major short term 
and longer term more likely sources of fiscal vulnerability for Lebanon. 
                                                 
6 Hemming and Petrie (2000)  
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The Political Environment 
18.       The stability, predictability, and transparency of a country’s political institutions are 
important considerations in analyzing the parameters of economic policymaking, including 
how quickly fiscal policy errors are identified and corrected. National security is a concern 
when military threats place significant burdens on fiscal policy, reduce the flow of potential 
investment and puts the balance of payments under stress
7.  
19.       Political risk is of special importance to Lebanon due to its rich history of political 
unrest, civil and regional wars, geostrategic position, and paralyzed internal political 
structure. Quantifying political instability is tricky, and is not the object of this paper. 
However, it is useful to identify four variables
8 that help quantify political instability in 
Lebanon specifically. They are: 
•  Political polarization, or the effective number of parties. Bussiere and Mulder (1999) 
argue that needed reforms are delayed because parties cannot agree on the cost of the 
reform, and not on the necessity of reform. 
•  Political cohesion of the government, where government effectiveness is hampered 
by having to cooperate with coalition partners. 
•  Electoral indecision, also known as the volatility index, and is defined as uncertainty 
about the political process (usually elections or approving the budget) and its 
outcomes. Agents cannot make predictions about fundamentals like inflation targets, 
commitment to the exchange regime, and the budget deficit if the result of the 
political process in question is a major unknown. 
•  Election dates, as periods of elections appear to carry increased amounts of 
vulnerability or uncertainty. 
This said, simply assuming that governments will always take the right measures to reduce 
economic vulnerabilities misses an important point: governments are sometimes unable to 
implement reforms because they face political constraints. 
20.       In Lebanon’s case, these constraints are often more binding than they seem and are 
always present in the background: Lebanon’s complex social and ethnic structure, a structure 
based more on sectarianism and clan mentality and allegiance than nationalism, is well 
mirrored in parliament and high levels of government. Every political decision has to be 
carefully considered so as to satisfy a complex set of constraints. Later in Section III, it will 
be emphasized that no major fiscal reforms can effectively be undertaken before the planned 
                                                 
7 Standards and Poors (April 2002) 
8 Bussiere and Mulder (April 1999)  
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2005 general elections: The recent de facto sacking of Prime Minister Hariri (widely viewed 
as pro-markets and pro-reforms) and his team of ministers (including the minister of Finance) 
cast shadows of doubt on whether the new government headed by Mr. Karameh (an old-
guard political and social consensus figure) can effectively undertake any significant 
changes, including most importantly the Paris II privatization commitments. 
The Initial Fiscal Position 
21.       The initial fiscal position and the short-term forecast is sensitive to changes in 
macroeconomic variables like GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, interest rates, external 
trade, capital flows, the exchange rate, and other variables affecting revenue, expenditure, 
and financing. Lebanon’s initial fiscal position (today) is plagued by vulnerabilities as 
described in Section II.A, including a growing reliance on direct taxes, a high level of 
nondiscretionary spending, a large albeit shrinking interest bill, and generally little fiscal 
flexibility. For assumptions on key macroeconomic variables in the medium term, see Table 
5. Specifically, there is evidence suspicion that in periods of higher interest rates, and in the 
absence of further fiscal adjustments, the current trend of debt dynamics may well be 
unsustainable. 
Contingent Liabilities 
22.       Experience in recent crises suggests that contingent liabilities are often an important 
source of increases in public indebtness
9. Explicit liabilities include state guarantee for non-
sovereign borrowing, trade and exchange rate guarantees, and State insurance schemes, while 
implicit guarantees include financial system bailouts, and clean up of liabilities of entities 
being privatized, to name a few. 
23.       Relevant contingent liabilities for Lebanon include transfers to EdL and NSSF, an 
implicit commitment to the fixed exchange rate, and liability cleanup of SOEs proposed for 
privatization. Also, even though the financial system in Lebanon is reasonably sound, liquid 
and capitalized, one cannot exclude the possibility of a financial system bailout in case a 
banking crisis ensues. 
Structural Weaknesses 
24.       The institutional capacity for fiscal management is a major determinant of fiscal 
vulnerability in Lebanon: most notably among the institutional aspects are the government 
roles and responsibilities (public sector size), the public availability of information, the 
budget process, and the integrity of fiscal information. The IMF consistently qualifies the 
national accounts data system of Lebanon as being “inadequate in depth and coverage and 
unsuitable for any policy analysis framework”. 
                                                 
9 In Indonesia, for example, public debt rose by more than 50 percent of GDP in the aftermath of the crisis, much of which 
reflected issuance of new debt to finance the recapitalization of banks by the central bank.  
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25.       Finally, a government that has a general reputation for being ineffective, opaque, and 
corrupt will usually be vulnerable. Lebanon has shown over the years, with varying degrees, 
symptoms of nontransparency and corruption. 
 
III.   ASSUMPTIONS AND MEDIUM-TERM PROJECTION 
A.   Key Macroeconomic Assumptions 
Growth 
26.       The economy is estimated to grow at 4 percent in 2005 and 2006
10 in real terms, and 
around 3.5 percent from 2007 to 2009. Growth will mainly driven by external demand for 
Lebanese services (tourism), and internal buoyancy in the construction sector. Furthermore, 
government difficulty in curbing non-debt spending is also fuelling growth, keeping 
government consumption (Cg) high. 
Inflation 
27.       The expected pickup in demand is likely to cause a similar moderate rise in 
inflationary pressure over the forecast period. Furthermore, sustained pressure is expected 
from the fact that the U.S. dollar, and hence the Lebanese pound, remains weak against the 
Euro, adding to final prices of certain imported goods and services. The economy is 
operating well within its capacity however. 
Exchange and Interest Rates 
28.       For most countries, there is little reason to presume that a move to a  more flexible 
exchange rate regime would consistently lower real interest rates: real rates might be lower in 
some periods than they would be if they were tied to rates in an anchor country, and higher in 
others. This flexibility is valuable because, under a flexible regime the authorities can 
presumably choose to vary the real rate to suit the situation of the domestic economy. 
(Nominal rates might even be higher if inflation credibility is lower under a flexible regime.) 
However, for Lebanon, real rates might be secularly lower under a flexible exchange rate 
regime: a flexible regime may increase the chance of sustained or very high inflation, of 
which Lebanon has had experience, but by the same token it reduces the chances of a default, 
which might be even more harmful to real output and loan quality. Hence, on balance risk 
premia might be lowered. 
29.       It is unlikely however, for mostly political and credibility reasons, that the 
government will abandon the peg to the dollar in the forecast period. 
                                                 
10 Economist Intelligence Unit (November 2004)  
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B.   Baseline Scenario 
30.       For the baseline scenario (Table 3), the general assumption is that the government 
will not undertake any major structural fiscal (or other) reform in the near future. On the 
revenue side, government plans of increasing the VAT rate, possibly introducing a tax on 
income, and improving tax collection in general will not materialize during the forecast 
period. On the expenditure side, expenditure discipline is expected to loosen up starting 2005 
through increased capital expenditure outlays earmarked for long overdue reconstruction and 
infrastructure upgrading. Furthermore, plans to privatize EdL will fall flat and transfers to 
offset EdL losses will continue and pickup pace moderately. Transfers to the NSSF will also 
pickup pace in 2005 and continue. Most other items will grow with inflation. 
C.   Adjustment Scenario 
31.       For the adjustment scenario (Table 4), the main assumption is that the government 
will have to undertake a comprehensive program of fiscal restructuring aimed at improving 
expenditure discipline and increasing revenue in the long-term. On the revenue side, the 
VAT rate will increase by 30 percent relative to the present rate (VAT rate moves from 10 to 
13 percent), EdL will be privatized in 2007 and “other nontax revenue” will adjust 
accordingly from 2008 onwards. The idea of income tax introduction will remain however 
just an idea as it is socially and politically very unpopular. On the expenditure side, capital 
spending will be capped, transfers to EdL will phase out starting 2007, and a restructuring 
program for the NSSF to protect the government from contingent liabilities will temporarily 
increase transfers in 2005 and 2006, but will phase out these transfers starting 2007. For both 
scenarios, wages and salaries will only grow with inflation. 
D.   Projection Results 
 




























































































































IV.   CONCLUSION 
32.       The authorities have been adamant, at Paris II and other occasions, that they view any 
eventual breach of contract (default) as disastrous, and would rather follow any other 
strategy. The only debt instruments, the conditions on which the authorities will never have 
to breach, are those denominated in Lebanese pounds, because the authorities can always 
create Lebanese pound liquidity. Put another way, the authorities seem to truly prefer 
hyperinflation to default. This said, the results of the projection suggests that, for both 
scenarios really, the debt dynamics will return to a seemingly unsustainable path starting 
2007, after a brief period of stabilization (Figures 3, 4, and 5 above). The Baseline Scenario 
would require a 2.5 percent of GDP debt-stabilizing primary surplus, and the  
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Adjustment Scenario requires an even bigger debt-stabilizing primary surplus (around 
6.2 percent of GDP) over the forecast period. 
 
33.       However, given that the threat of an involuntary government debt restructuring and 
an ensuing banking crisis has certainly not completely disappeared—there is still a lot of 
uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the government’s additional fiscal efforts and the 
size of the proposed privatization receipts—the authorities should also use this time to 
develop further contingency plans to mitigate the impact of a possible involuntary 
government debt restructuring, in particular on the banking system. 
34.       The positive outcome of the Paris II conference (November 24, 2002) has given the 
Lebanese authorities some “breathing space” in which to address the stock and flow fiscal 
difficulties that are at the heart of the country’s economic vulnerabilities. This author 
believes that Paris II was indeed a missed opportunity, and that the urgency that preceded 
Paris II is emerging again today: Lebanon seems to have gone full circle since 2001. 
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Table 1. Government Operations pre-1998 
 
1972 1974 1975 1976 1980 1988 1989 1991 1995 1997
Revenue 12.1 15.6 10.7 3.7 13.7 1.8 6.8 15.9 16.8 16.4
  Tax Revenue 8.0 11.5 7.5 2.0 9.5 0.6 1.4 5.4 11.1 12.6
    Indirect Taxes 5.6 8.9 6.4 1.9 7.0 0.1 0.3 3.2 9.5 10.7
      of which custom duties 2.4 2.6 1.1 0.2 2.4 0.5 1.1 2.4 7.3 7.5
    Direct taxes 2.4 2.6 1.1 0.2 2.4 0.5 1.1 2.2 1.6 2.0
  Nontax revenue 4.1 4.1 3.1 1.7 4.3 1.2 5.5 10.5 5.7 3.8
Expenditure 15.4 15.0 13.6 15.7 27.1 19.2 39.1 28.9 35.2 42.2
   Current expenditure 12.1 12.4 7.6 12.6 20.9 17.8 36.7 25.1 25.7 33.6
    Wages and Salaries ... ... ... ... 8.5 4.5 7.2 9.0 10.4 10.8
    Other current ... ... ... ... 10.8 4.5 10.9 10.3 3.8 7.4
    Interest payments ... ... ... ... 1.5 5.9 11.3 5.0 10.4 14.8
       Domestic ... ... ... ... 1.5 5.8 11.2 4.9 9.7 14.1
       Foreign ... ... ... ... 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.7
    EdL fuel subsidy ... ... ... ... ... 2.9 7.4 0.8 1.2 0.7
   Capital expenditure 3.3 2.6 6.1 3.1 6.3 1.4 2.4 3.9 9.4 8.6
Overall Balance (excluding grants) -3.3 0.6 -3.0 -12.0 -13.4 -17.4 -32.3 -13.1 -18.4 -25.8
Primary Balance (excluding grants) 0.0 3.2 3.1 -8.9 -7.2 -16.0 -29.9 -9.2 -8.9 -17.2
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Banque du Liban, Council for Development and Reconstruction
(in percent of GDP)
Postwar Years
Selected 
Prewar Years Selected War Years
 
 
Table 2. Anatomy of Public Debt 
 
2002 2003 2004
Gross debt 30, 727 33, 382 34, 718
   D o m estic currency 1 6 ,7 8 4 1 7 ,8 0 7 1 8 ,8 7 9
   Foreign Currency 13, 943 15, 575 15, 839
   D eb t to  B d L 2 ,3 5 1 7 ,9 3 8 7 ,8 7 4
     D o m estic C urrency 4 7 9 5 ,9 2 9 5 ,8 9 6
     F o reign C urrency 1 ,8 7 2 2 ,0 0 9 1 ,9 7 8
   Debt to commercial banks 18, 256 14, 526 16,265
     D o m estic C urrency 1 1 ,4 1 7 8 ,1 6 1 8 ,7 0 8
     F o reign C urrency 6 ,8 3 9 6 ,3 6 5 7 ,5 5 7
   D ebt to public entities 2,137 1,701 1,660
   Other debt to nonbank sector 7, 983 9, 217 8,919
     D o m estic C urrency 2 ,7 5 1 2 ,0 1 6 2 ,6 1 5
     F o reign C urrency 5 ,2 3 2 7 ,2 0 1 6 ,3 0 4
Gross debt 177. 7 185. 0 177.9
   D o m estic currency 9 7 .1 9 8 .7 9 6 .8
   F o reign C urrency 8 0 .6 8 6 .3 8 1 .2
0. 0 0. 0 0.0
   Debt to BdL 13. 6 44. 0 40.4
     D o m estic C urrency 2 .8 3 2 .9 3 0 .2
     Foreign C urrency 10.8 11.1 10.1
   D eb t to  co m m ercial b anks 1 0 5 .6 8 0 .5 8 3 .4
     D o m estic C urrency 6 6 .0 4 5 .2 4 4 .6
     Foreign C urrency 39.6 35.3 38.7
   D ebt to public entities 12.4 9.4 8.5
   O ther d eb t to  no nb ank secto r 4 6 .2 5 1 .1 4 5 .7
     D o m estic C urrency 1 5 .9 1 1 .2 1 3 .4
     Foreign C urrency 30.3 39.9 32.3
(in m illions of U .S . dollars)
(in percent of GDP)
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Table 3. Fiscal Operations Projection: Baseline Scenario 
 
Prel.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Primary Balance 763 974 1,228 432 371 283 185 75
Revenue 5,828 6,596 7,151 7,437 7,660 7,890 8,127 8,370
  Tax Revenue 3,996 4,526 4,938 5,136 5,290 5,448 5,612 5,780
   Taxes on income and profit 727 783 912 948 977 1,006 1,036 1,068
   Taxes on property 300 321 382 397 409 421 434 447
   Taxes on domestic goods and services 1,162 1,560 1,839 1,913 1,970 2,029 2,090 2,153
     of which: VAT revenue 1,013 1,386 1,640 1,706 1,757 1,809 1,864 1,920
   Taxes on international trade 1,618 1,645 1,533 1,594 1,642 1,691 1,742 1,794
    Tariffs 595 475 516 537 553 569 586 604
    Excises 1,023 1,170 1,017 1,058 1,089 1,122 1,156 1,190
   Other taxes 189 217 272 283 291 300 309 318
  Nontax revenue 1,832 2,070 2,213 2,302 2,371 2,442 2,515 2,590
     Enterpreneurial and property income 933 1,252 1,374 1,429 1,472 1,516 1,561 1,608
        P r o f i t  t r a n s f e r  f r o m  B d L 2 0 0 0 00000
        Other 913 1,252 1,374 1,429 1,472 1,516 1,561 1,608
     Admin fees and charges 373 383 377 392 404 416 428 441
     Other nontax revenue 98 81 83 86 89 92 94 97
       f i n e s  a n d  f o r f e i t s 2 2 6 6 66777
       other 76 75 77 80 82 85 88 90
    Other treasury revenue 428 354 379 394 406 418 431 444
Primary expenditure 5,065 5,622 5,923 7,005 7,289 7,607 7,942 8,295
   Current primary expenditure 4,485 4,708 4,947 5,155 5,309 5,469 5,633 5,802
     Wages, salaries and pensions 3,008 3,078 3,186 3,262 3,360 3,461 3,565 3,672
        Wages and salaries 2,151 2,234 2,300 2,355 2,426 2,499 2,574 2,651
        Pension benefits 857 844 886 907 934 963 991 1,021
    Transfers to EdL 60 174 206 300 309 318 328 338
    Other current 1,417 1,456 1,555 1,592 1,640 1,689 1,740 1,792
      of which transfers to NSSF 227 271 300 550 567 583 601 619
   Capital expenditure 580 914 976 1,850 1,980 2,138 2,309 2,494
      Domestically financed 392 713 775 1,480 1,524 1,570 1,617 1,666
      Foreign financed 188 201 201 370 396 428 462 499
Interest bill 4,712 4,942 3,743 3,510 4,020 4,665 4,963 5,112
Overall balance -3,949 -3,968 -2,515 -3,078 -3,649 -4,382 -4,778 -5,037
GDP nominal 26,076 27,199 29,416 31,299 33,490 35,666 37,985 40,454
Actual Baseline Scenario
















Table 4. Fiscal Operations Projection: Adjustment Scenario 
 
Prel.
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Primary Balance 763 974 1,228 1,853 1,869 2,189 2,353 2,404
Revenue 5,828 6,596 7,151 8,008 8,248 8,496 8,906 9,216
  Tax Revenue 3,996 4,526 4,938 5,706 5,878 6,054 6,235 6,423
   Taxes on income and profit 727 783 912 948 977 1,006 1,036 1,068
   Taxes on property 300 321 382 397 409 421 434 447
   Taxes on domestic goods and services 1,162 1,560 1,839 2,483 2,558 2,635 2,714 2,795
     of which: VAT revenue 1,013 1,386 1,640 2,217 2,284 2,352 2,423 2,496
   Taxes on international trade 1,618 1,645 1,533 1,594 1,642 1,691 1,742 1,794
    Tariffs 595 475 516 537 553 569 586 604
    Excises 1,023 1,170 1,017 1,058 1,089 1,122 1,156 1,190
   Other taxes 189 217 272 283 291 300 309 318
  Nontax revenue 1,832 2,070 2,213 2,302 2,371 2,442 2,671 2,793
     Enterpreneurial and property income 933 1,252 1,374 1,429 1,472 1,516 1,561 1,608
        P r o f i t  t r a n s f e r  f r o m  B d L 2 0 0 0 00000
        Other 913 1,252 1,374 1,429 1,472 1,516 1,561 1,608
     Admin fees and charges 373 383 377 392 404 416 428 441
     Other nontax revenue 98 81 83 86 89 92 250 300
       f i n e s  a n d  f o r f e i t s 2 2 6 6 66777
       other 76 75 77 80 82 85 88 90
    Other treasury revenue 428 354 379 394 406 418 431 444
Primary expenditure 5,065 5,622 5,923 6,155 6,379 6,306 6,553 6,812
   Current primary expenditure 4,485 4,708 4,947 5,155 5,309 5,150 5,305 5,464
     Wages, salaries and pensions 3,008 3,078 3,186 3,262 3,360 3,461 3,565 3,672
        Wages and salaries 2,151 2,234 2,300 2,355 2,426 2,499 2,574 2,651
        Pension benefits 857 844 886 907 934 963 991 1,021
    T r a n s f e r s  t o  E d L 6 0 1 7 4 2 0 63 0 0 3 0 9000
    Other current 1,417 1,456 1,555 1,592 1,640 1,689 1,740 1,792
      of which transfers to NSSF 227 271 300 550 750 50 50 50
   Capital expenditure 580 914 976 1000 1,070 1,156 1,248 1,348
      Domestically financed 392 713 775 770 824 890 961 1,038
      Foreign financed 188 201 201 230 246 266 287 310
Interest bill 4,712 4,942 3,743 3,510 4,020 4,665 4,963 5,112
Overall balance -3,949 -3,968 -2,515 -1,657 -2,151 -2,476 -2,610 -2,708
GDP nominal 26,076 27,199 29,416 31,299 33,490 35,666 37,985 40,454
Actual Adjustment Scenario
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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Real GDP growth (in percent) 1.2 -0.4 -0.6 2.0 2.0 5.0 1.5 2.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Average nominal interest rate on public debt (in 
percent) 13.0 12.4 11.3 11.0 10.7 7.4 11.0 2.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 11.0
Average real interest rate (nominal minus 
deflator, in percent) 13.0 13.0 9.1 9.3 8.4 4.4 9.5 3.2 5.6 6.0 7.0 8.0 8.0
Nominal appreciation (increase in US dollar 
value of local currency, in percent) 0 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 00 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 00 . 00 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 0.0 -0.5 2.3 1.8 2.3 3.0 1.5 1.4 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Growth of real primary spending (deflated by 
GDP deflator, in percent) 5.0 28.1 -25.6 -2.8 8.5 0.8 2.3 17.4 0.5 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0




Table 6. Medium-term Projection Summary Results 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Real GDP growth (in percent) 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 3.0 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Primary balance (million LP) 1,228 432 371 283 185 75
Primary balance (percent of GDP) 4.2 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.5 0.2
Overall balance (million LP) -2,515 -3,078 -3,649 -4,382 -4,778 -5,037
Overall balance (percent of GDP) -8.5 -9.8 -10.9 -12.3 -12.6 -12.5
Gross debt ( million LP) 52,320 55,398 59,047 63,428 68,206 73,243
Gross debt (percent of GDP) 177.9 177.0 176.3 177.8 179.6 181.1
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Real GDP growth (in percent) 5.0 4.0 4.0 3.5 3.5 3.5
Inflation rate (GDP deflator, in percent) 3.0 2.4 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Primary balance (million LP) 1,228 1,853 1,869 2,189 2,353 2,404
Primary balance (percent of GDP) 4.2 5.9 5.6 6.1 6.2 5.9
Overall balance (million LP) -2,515 -1,657 -2,151 -2,476 -2,610 -2,708
Overall balance (percent of GDP) -8.5 -5.3 -6.4 -6.9 -6.9 -6.7
Gross debt ( million LP) 52,320 53,977 57,549 61,522 66,038 70,914
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